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Abstract 
Informal inter-organizational networks provide manifold opportunities to organize the transfer of 
information, knowledge and technology between actors. Given their potential and their importance, the 
lack of theoretical discussion and empirical research on informal networks and their dynamics is 
surprising. The objective of this paper is twofold. It attempts to review the fragmented academic 
discussion of the notion of informal networking, thereby focusing on how these relationships emerge 
initially and what conditions (presumably) are required to make them a mutually fruitful and 
sustainable channel of the transfer of information and knowledge. On that groundwork, the most 
important empirical studies which try to confirm and disentangle the aforementioned basic 
mechanisms of informal exchange relationships are reviewed. Finally, we outline an agenda of future 
research directions that we encourage researchers to pursue in future empirical studies. Five 
important research gaps can be identified. 
 
Zusammenfassung 
Informelle Netzwerkstrukturen bieten vielfältige Möglichkeiten, den Transfer von Informationen, 
Wissen und Technologie zwischen Akteuren zu organisieren. In Anbetracht des Potentials sowie der 
Bedeutung informeller Netzwerke ist der bestehende Mangel an theoretischen Diskussionen wie auch 
empirischer Forschung überraschend. Hier setzt der Beitrag an, indem eine Bündelung der bislang 
lediglich in Fragmenten vorliegenden Auseinandersetzung mit dem Konzept informeller Netzwerke 
vorgenommen wird. Der Fokus wird dabei auf Fragen der Entstehung solcher Netzwerkstrukturen 
sowie auf diejenigen Faktoren gelegt, die notwendig sind, informelle Netzwerke als effektiven und 
beständigen Kanal des Wissens- und Technologietransfers nutzbar zu machen. In einem zweiten Teil 
des Beitrags wird ein Überblick über die wichtigsten, zum gegenwärtigen Zeitpunkt existierenden, 
Studien gegeben, die sich empirisch mit dem Konzept informeller Netzwerkstrukturen 
auseinandersetzen. Basierend auf dieser Aufarbeitung werden anschließend fünf wichtige 
Forschungsfragen formuliert, die im Fokus zukünftiger Forschungsbestrebungen stehen sollten. 
JEL Klassifikation: D85, O31, O32  
Schlüsselwörter: Informelle Netzwerke, Information trading, Wissenstransfer, Literaturüberblick 
 
E-Mail Adressen der Autoren: Michael.Schwartz@iwh-halle.de; Christoph.Hornych@iwh-halle.de 
 
  
4 
1. Introduction 
Basically, informal networks can occur between individuals within organizational 
boundaries but, for instance, across functional barriers (Cross et al., 2002)1, within 
organizational (innovation focused) teams (Jewels et al., 2003; Kratzer et al., 2006), 
or between individuals of different organizations (Janowicz-Panjaitan and 
Noorderhaven, 2008). We concentrate on the latter issue, that is inter-organizational 
informal networking. This network may include a multitude of actors, such as 
(individuals from)2 firms, university departments, public and private research 
institutes, governmental agencies, etc. Informal inter-organizational networks provide 
manifold opportunities to organize the transfer of information, knowledge and 
technology between these actors.  
According to Jewels et al. (2003:5/6) informal networks can be understood as ‘ (…) 
relationships developed between individuals independently of any formal structure 
(…) built over time and used as complementary knowledge sharing alternatives to an 
organization’s formal strategy.’ In many cases, such informal non-contractual 
relationships are a necessary stage towards more formalized connections, such as 
R&D cooperation, supplier-customer relationships or technology exchange 
agreements. As for instance Freeman (1991:503) underscores: ‘‘(…) behind every 
formal network, giving it the breath of life, are usually various informal networks.’ 
Thus, the importance of informal networking as channel of knowledge transfer is 
widely acknowledged. 
Given their potential and their importance, the lack of theoretical discussion and 
empirical research on informal networks and their dynamics is surprising. This may 
be explained with their fundamental invisibility and intangibility that make these 
modes of knowledge transfer not only difficult to govern by organizations (Cross et 
al., 2002), but also difficult to investigate empirically by researchers. These transfers 
(mostly) leave no paper trails.3 The objective of this paper is twofold. It attempts to 
                                                 
1
  Notwithstanding the importance of social contacts and informal networking in the context of job 
search and job mobility, it will not be discussed here. For related discussion, see for instance 
Datcher (1983) and Datcher-Loury (2006). Additionally, knowledge transfer and diffusion through 
job mobility (within local agglomerations) will also not be considered (see Rogers, 1982; Almeida 
and Kogut, 1999; Breschi and Lissoni, 2001). 
2
  Since this dimension of networking focuses on inter-personal relationships between individuals, the 
so-called ‘know-who’ knowledge of ‘(…) who knows what and who knows to do what’ (Lundvall, 
1996:6) is increasingly important (see also Lundvall, 2004; Jensen et al., 2007). 
3
  For reasons of simplicity, in research settings sometimes such personal networks are subsumed 
under inter-organizational network structures (between firms), but such an approach ignores 
complex interactions on the (inter-) personal level (see Grabher and Ibert, 2006 for related 
criticisms). Referring to this difference, Czepiel (1974) differentiates between interorganizational 
relations and interorganizational communication, and notes in this regard (p. 179): ‘The former 
concept implies the existence of a general relationship which exists between organizations as 
organizations. The latter is concerned with actual communication which (…) involves individuals in 
organizations.’ 
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review the fragmented academic discussion of the notion of informal networking, 
thereby focusing on how these relationships emerge initially and what conditions 
(presumably) are required to make them a mutually fruitful and sustainable channel 
of the transfer of information and knowledge. Since the connection between the 
embeddedness of individual actors in social networks and the consequence for their 
performance is the central subject of social capital theory, a short overview about the 
basic elements of this approach is given. On that groundwork, the most important 
empirical studies trying to confirm and disentangle the aforementioned basic 
mechanisms of informal exchange relationships are reviewed. The last part of the 
paper is dedicated to an outline of an agenda of (so far under-studied or even 
unanswered) research questions, which clearly deserve deeper investigation to 
further open the ‘black-box’ of informal networking.  
 
2. Social capital as linking element 
The benefits that employees or individuals can achieve through networking get to the 
core of the matter of social capital theory. The term social capital was introduced by 
Bourdieu (1983). He defines social capital as the set of resources based on the 
affiliation to a group or a network. Beside this link between social capital and 
networks, a second key element of social capital theory is the idea that individuals 
can make use of their social capital to achieve personal objectives (Bourdieu, 1983; 
Burt, 1992; Portes, 1998). The possibility of a well-directed use of personal 
relationships is also highlighted by Coleman (1988:98):  
’Social capital is defined by its function. It is not a single entity but a variety 
of different entities, with two elements in common: they all consist of some 
aspect of social structures, and they facilitate certain actions of actors - 
whether persons or corporate actors - within the structure. Like other forms 
of capital, social capital is productive, making possible the achievement of 
certain ends that in its absence would not be possible‘ 
A similar but more pronounced specification is provided by Portes (1998:6), who 
defines social capital as the ‘... the ability of actors to secure benefits by virtue of 
membership in social networks or other social structures‘. 
The theoretical background for the economic significance of networks is derived from 
the criticism by representatives of social capital theory on the neoclassical 
assumption of atomistic markets (Coleman, 1990; Burt, 1992; Fukuyama, 1995; 
Portes, 1998; Arrow, 1999). Since there is a risk of opportunistic behaviour in market 
transactions, the identity of an exchange partner gains in importance. Under these 
conditions, social networks have also importance for economic issues. For example, 
Granovetter (1985) describes the preference for transactions with a person who is 
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already known. In this context, social capital is a source of information about the 
reputation of potential exchange partners. This may have particular importance in the 
market for information. In general, the transaction costs of the transmission of 
information are rather low. However, the seller cannot be sure, that after the 
transaction the buyer offers the information on the market itself. In addition, the 
trading of information is complicated by the fact that the real value for the buyer is 
observable only after the transaction (Arrow 1961). Under these circumstances, the 
exchange knowledge and information will be much easier if the partners personally 
know each other. In general, social capital can contribute to the development of trust, 
reduce opportunistic behaviour and increase the efficiency of economic transactions 
(Granovetter, 1985, 2005; Coleman, 1988, 1990; Raub and Weesie 1990). 
Against this background, social capital is understood as a valuable resource, 
comparable with human or physical capital (Coleman, 1988; Lin, 2001; Glaeser et al., 
2002). Social capital is accumulated through investments of time and attention in 
social relationships and therefore takes up scarce resources. However, in contrast to 
other types of capital, social capital has some specific features. First of all, social 
capital results from a relationship from at least two individuals, who cannot realise the 
benefits of social capital independently from each other. Moreover, social capital is 
inalienable and cannot be transferred to another person (Loury, 1987; Sobel, 2002). 
As an organization is using the human capital of its employees, it can also benefit 
from the social capital of its staff. For this purpose it must use the social capital and 
the networks of the employees as conduits for transfer of knowledge into the 
organization. The next chapter describes existing theoretical ideas how this 
knowledge transfer through informal networks occurs.  
 
3. Knowledge transfer through informal networks – Some essentials 
3.1 The ‘trading’ of information 
Within one year following the initiation of development efforts for a new product, 
comprehensive technological knowledge about its functionality and composition leaks 
out to about 70% of the developing firms’ rivals (Mansfield, 1985). Relying on formal 
appropriability mechanisms, such as secrecy-policies, does not prevent the 
disclosure and diffusion of proprietary information and knowledge. The appropriation 
of future profits resulting from expensive R&D and innovative endeavors are 
jeopardized (von Hippel, 1987), which in turn impairs the competitive position of the 
innovating firm. Similar problems are faced by universities and other public research 
organizations, when knowledge and technologies leaving the institutions ‘(…) out of 
the back door, and hence the university is not realizing sufficient revenue from its 
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intellectual property portfolio.’ (Link et al., 2007:652). This inevitably raises the 
question, through which channels does this knowledge spread actually? 
Currently, there is no comprehensive theoretical framework to explain the origins, 
dynamics and impacts of informal networks. The following three sub-sections, 
therefore, bring together the different theoretical ideas that have been introduced in 
the academic discussion about knowledge sharing through informal networking. 
Researchers argue that knowledge transfer through informal contacts is best 
described via the notion of ‘information trading’ or ‘knowhow trading’4 (Von Hippel, 
1987; Carter, 1989; Schrader, 1991; 1995; Von Hippel and Schrader, 1996).5 
According to Pyka (1997:210) ‘Informal know-how trading is the voluntary exchange 
of technical information and can be interpreted as a process of actively initiating 
technological spillovers.’ However, one may broaden this understanding by 
subsuming also the direct involvement in the exchange of non-technical information 
by managerial personnel. For instance, information regarding valuable business 
opportunities, new patent applications, distribution channels (of unfamiliar regional 
markets), or knowledge of appropriate support programs have great potential to 
contribute significantly to the competitive position of a firm. 
Individuals, in most cases scientists or engineers but also actors on the 
‘management level’, establish their own specific network of informal contacts (beyond 
the organizational boundaries) that they tap into if unforeseen problems occur, which 
might require novel solutions. The ‘list of possible useful contacts’ (Pyka 1997:210) – 
occasionally but not essentially bounded by ties of friendship – might evolve from 
past workshops, meetings at conferences, trade fairs, common professional 
backgrounds (former colleagues), former collaborations within formalized projects, as 
well as from shared times in school, college or leisure time activities.  
Professional colleagues might have encountered comparable, or even identical, 
problems during their work and probably have developed problem-solving strategies 
already. Gaining access to this specialized know-how not only bears immense 
potential to save time and (in-house development) costs for the inquiring actors’ 
                                                 
4
  Following von Hippel (1987:291) know-how can be considered as ‘…the accumulated practical skill 
or expertise which allows one to do something smoothly and efficiently.’ 
5
  This specific pattern of informal cooperation, though it is somewhat related, must be differentiated 
from the ‘collective invention’ phenomenon (Allen, 1983). ‘Collective invention’ can be considered 
as routine or systematic informal collaboration, which induces collective learning and economic 
benefits for all participants (of the whole industry), as demonstrated by Allen (1983) or Fauchart 
(2003). The ‘trading of information’, as it might be understood here, refers to the opportunistic (ad-
hoc) non-systematic process of knowledge sharing between two or few partners (see Fauchart, 
2003 for this distinction). Von Hippel (1987:297) also draws a similar distinction: ‘The essential 
difference between know-how trading and collective invention it that know-how trading involves an 
exchange of valuable information between traders which at the same time kept secret from the 
non-traders. In contrast, collective invention requires that all competitors and potential competitors 
be given free access to proprietary know-how.’ 
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employing firm, but facilitates its own job as well. Internalizing pieces of external 
knowledge, however, is not straightforward (Mcdonald, 1992). A certain level of 
‘absorptive capacity’ (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; 1990), that is ‘the ability of a firm to 
recognize the value of new, external information, assimilate it, and apply it to 
commercial ends’ (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990:128), might be required. Similar 
professional expertise, academic education, and overlapping mental models of 
individuals (Sattler et al., 2003) might bridge such knowledge gaps between 
organizations by assuring the mandatory level of absorptive capacity, thus providing 
fertile grounds for acquiring and understanding externally available knowledge from 
within informal networks. 
Such processes are not restricted to non-competing firms, but they may also (or 
particularly) apply to rivals under specific conditions (von Hippel 1987; Hamel et al., 
1989; Sattler et al., 2003). Rather, it seems reasonable to assume that the most 
valuable contacts are found in competing firms, because they use similar 
machineries and equipment, or produce similar goods.  
 
3.2 Reciprocity – or ‘What goes around comes around’ 
Unlike pure market transactions, reciprocity is considered to be a crucial mechanism 
for efficient long-term relationships within informal networks. By reciprocity, we refer 
to the essential process of mutual valuable exchange of information, knowledge and 
technology. Although, there is no direct accounting of the value of information and 
knowledge given and received, respectively, there is the implicit assumption (or even 
obligation) of returning a favor in the future (not necessarily short-term) for reaching 
equivalence (Carter, 1991; Grabher, 1993; Von Hippel, 1989). The actual value of 
information exchanged is supposed to be positively related to the probability to repay 
this ‘depth’ in the future (Schrader, 1995; Dahl and Pedersen, 2005).6 
Reciprocity might be understood as a bilateral exchange relationship between two 
single actors, as well as multilateral mechanisms linking multiple network partners (as 
for example in a three-way-trade of technological knowledge) (Mcdonald, 1992). 
Participating in information trading can also occur if the sender does not expect to 
receive a reciprocal exchange from one particular counterpart, but from any member 
from the informal network. In a long-term multiple-trade environment, it is expected 
that every partner contributes roughly equal to the exchange patterns in the network.  
                                                 
6
  Based on early attempts to formalize the decision problem ‘to trade or not to trade’ by von Hippel 
(1987) as prisoner’s dilemma, Schrader (1995) uses a simple game-theoretical model that is well-
suited to illustrate, under which circumstances information trading is beneficial for firms. This model 
is not reviewed here, but can be seen in Schrader (1995:157-158). 
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If reciprocity is prevented permanently (in bilateral or multilateral relationships), 
reputation of agents suffers and the entire exchange relationship is expected to 
become weaker, which reduces the likelihood of transferring valuable knowledge. In 
discussing the importance of reciprocity for reputation in networks, Kranton 
(1996:832) states that ‘repeated interaction and reputation mechanisms can enforce 
cooperation and sustain intertemporal exchange.’ 
 
3.3 Competitive backlash, trade-offs and the pursuit of recognition 
Problems of undesired, excessive or disadvantageous ‘knowledge leaking’ in 
informal interactions are well known (see the introduction to section 3). First of all, 
since by definition there is no formal transfer agreement, there neither is certainty nor 
any direct control or monitoring mechanisms that receiving actors keep that 
knowledge private, that is within the firm (Dahl and Pedersen, 2005).7 This is 
especially true for emerging personal relationships where reciprocity, trust and 
mutual reputation are not yet well developed. A broad (social) network embedding 
these agents could be able to reduce this uncertainty, because information regarding 
recipients’ ‘malpractice’ circulates within the network (redundancy) by word-of-mouth 
processes. As Schrader (1991:168) notes: ‘Thus, by not cooperating in one 
relationship, a player puts several relationships in jeopardy - a strong mechanism for 
enforcing cooperation.’ 
Conflicts within informal networks may arise in cases where a personal relationship 
(and probably the increased feelings of obligation and reciprocity) is valued to be 
more important than employer loyalty (Rogers, 1982; Schrader, 1991). To sustain 
friendship, knowledge might be shared whose disclosure significantly threatens the 
firms’ competitive position, but would not have been given away in case of larger 
emotional distance. Such primarily personal-motivated damaging behavior might also 
be triggered by, what might be termed ‘pursuit of recognition’. An engineer, for 
instance, might strive to gain recognition in his professional community by 
consciously confessing the latest breakthrough of R&D efforts, irrespective from any 
                                                 
7  Consider a situation with two non-competing firms A and B where employees of these firms 
exchange information about, for instance, valuable market opportunities. Although, A and B are no 
competitors, it might be the case that B transfers this knowledge to a firm C, which, is a competitor 
of A. Similarly, Atallah (2004) points to an important issue that is related to multilateral information 
exchange. Modeling so called indirect information sharing, he states that an agent does not 
necessarily have to send his own information, but also information he received by a third party in 
past exchanges.  
Schrader (1991), however, disagrees. He argues that ‘industry norms’ would prevent such 
behaviors (and the public-good character of this information) and that the receiver of the 
information (B in our case) rather acts as a connector (between C and A), announcing that this 
specific piece of knowledge is available within the industry, but not disclosing it by itself. Indeed, 
such exchange behaviors have not been studied yet and doubts are remaining. 
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formalized secrecy policies or contractual arrangements (e.g., non-disclosure 
agreements). Moreover, individuals could be interested in increasing their personal 
value as an employee by demonstrating (scientific, technical, or market-related) 
expertise (Rogers, 1982; von Hippel, 1987; Carter, 1991).8 Instead, the employing 
firm wants to keep that information secret to appropriate the economic benefits. 
Trading this information might therefore jeopardize the firms’ competitive position. 
This contradiction re-emphasizes that studying informal networking presupposes a 
clear-cut differentiation between inter-organizational information exchange on the 
firm level and exchange relationships between single actors. Or, as Mcdonald 
(1992:55, emphasis in parentheses added) verbalizes: ‘Obligation to supply 
[information] is personal rather than a responsibility of the firm; networks are of 
individuals, collaboration is among firms’. 
 
4. Inter-organizational informal networking – A review of empirical evidence 
The following literature review is not systematic in a conventional sense that it 
focuses on specific research questions and screens the relevant literature according 
to these research questions. However, since there is an ongoing debate as to 
whether agents in informal networks in fact diffuse information and knowledge that is 
highly valuable or if this knowledge has a more general character of low value, and 
what factors might contribute to these patterns, this second review part puts some 
emphasis on these two issues.  
This section provides a review of those studies that apply a strong empirical 
approach on informal networking as source of inter-organizational knowledge 
transfer. To best of our knowledge, such an overview over existing empirical research 
findings regarding informal networking does not exist.9 As stated in the introduction, 
informal networks are much more difficult to capture by empirical investigations since, 
basically, they are not visible, intangible and in some cases not desired. These might 
be the reason why so few researchers address informal networking as research 
objective. Three broad types of studies can be distinguished:  
i.)  studies observing knowledge sharing patterns between actors of specific 
industries (sub-section 4.1),  
                                                 
8 
 However, it is at least questionable whether such strategies pay off, because ‘No one wants to hire 
someone with a penchant for betrayal’ (von Hippel, 1987:302). 
9
  It must be noted, that intra-organizational informal communication networks are not considered 
here (see e.g., Cross et al., 2002; Jewels et al., 2003; Kratzer et al., 2006; Rank, 2008). 
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ii.)  studies focusing on informal networking within particular agglomerations or 
‘clusters’ (of particular industries) thereby highlighting the importance of spatial 
proximity between sender and receiver (sub-section 4.2), and  
iii.) studies that particularly consider informal networking between academic 
institutions and industry partners (sub-section 4.3). 
 
4.1 Knowledge sharing in industries 
One of the first systematic attempts to turn the attention on patterns of industry know-
how sharing is made by von Hippel (1987) in his (highly recognized) empirical 
investigation of trading behavior in the US steel minimill industry. He observes the 
process of trading valuable know-how as consciously and routinely behavior 
(supported and approved by top management), even with direct competitors, 
dependent on expected reciprocity: ‘…they were able to go into considerable detail 
about the types of firms they did and did not deal with, and why dealing with a given 
firm would or would not involve a valuable two-way exchange of know-how.’ (p. 295). 
Von Hippel and Schrader (1996) interviewed 30 experts in the oil exploration industry 
to shed light on the patterns of ‘managed’ information trading between competing 
firms. Consistent with von Hippel (1987), they not only report in detail how 
information with considerable proprietary value is traded, but they also demonstrate 
the importance of two mechanisms securing this system. First, ‘specified trading 
norms’ guarantee reliability and prevent individuals from cheating in this network. 
And second, to avoid competitive backlash (by misjudging the value of information) 
only senior managers capable to evaluate the proprietary value of information are 
legitimated to decide on the trading of information of particular high (competitive) 
value. In sum, it is shown how management structures might reduce or even 
overcome some problems commonly associated with the trading of information. 
In contrast, Fauchart (2003) does not find evidence for the sharing of knowledge that 
can be considered competitive in his investigation of the chlor-alkali industry in 
Western Europe. Further evidence is given on the aspect of reciprocity. While on the 
inter-individual level reciprocity is important to sustain informal relationships, 
particularly for the disclosure of tacit knowledge. However, a distortion of reciprocity 
is accepted on the firm-level, because ‘Large firms (…) are aware that small firms 
have less resources than they have to participate and do not blame them (…)’ (p. 
16). Similar to von Hippel and Schrader (1996), Fauchart (2003) describes some kind 
of systematic informal sharing, ‘managed’ by an industry association. 
Schrader (1991; 1995) and Sattler et al. (2003) again concentrate on the US steel 
industry, and compare country-specific patterns of trading of technical information 
with German steel companies (Schrader, 1995; Sattler et al., 2003). First, it is found 
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that an overwhelming 98% of surveyed employees being asked for technical 
information by colleagues from other firms indeed provided the desired information. 
As important parameters influencing this decision are identified: degree of 
competition, importance of information to deciding party (both negatively related), 
availability of alternative sources, information relating to domains of low competitive 
importance, expected improvement of willingness to reciprocity (all positively related) 
(Schrader, 1991). Performing the US-Germany comparison by using survey 
responses from 292 middle-managers reveals that informal information exchange is 
more frequent in German firms. Like Schraders’ (1991) results, in both countries the 
requested information is provided significantly less frequent if the information is of 
considerable competitive value (e.g. information relating to areas where firms 
compete) for the transferring firm. Contrasting other results (see Dahl and Pederson, 
2004; 2005 below), personal relationships – though they structure informal networks 
– are less important for what actually is exchanged. Pure economic factors 
accounting for the costs and benefits for the deciding firm matter more for 
employees’ decision. 
More aggressive patterns of informal knowledge acquisition are depicted by Chen 
(2009) for firms from the machine tool (MT) industry in Taiwan. He reports that 
detailed knowledge about new products and technologies is often kept private by 
competitors within this industry. To outflank direct, little promising negotiations about 
other firms’ know-how, local suppliers act as intermediating actors (p.531):  
‘If a supplier, for instance, is subcontracted by one MT firm to manufacture 
or process a part or a component that he knows might be of great interest 
to his or her client MT firms, he may privately inform the second firm and 
invite its engineers to come over and take a look, as well as offering 
complementary technical information, such as technical drawings and 
know-how related to the manufacture of that product.’ 
This is another illustration (see also von Hippel, 1987) of how suppliers can be 
central facilitators of the informal diffusion of new knowledge in one industry. 
Although, all industry firms benefit, as suggested by Chen (2009), it is rather 
undesired ‘knowledge leaking’ than voluntary knowledge sharing. 
 
4.2 Knowledge sharing in ‘clusters’ 
The basic rationale behind studies concentrating on informal channels in ‘clusters’ or 
regional innovation systems, is that knowledge spillovers seem to be geographically 
bounded (e.g. Jaffe et al., 1993; Anselin et al., 1997; Zucker et al., 1998). Therefore, 
locating in close vicinity to the sources of those spillovers becomes crucial for their 
entrepreneurial exploitation (Audretsch and Feldman, 1996). Considering innovation 
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efforts in particular, close linkages act as catalyst for the exchange of experiences, 
and the transfer of valuable information and knowledge, particularly non-codified tacit 
knowledge. The transfer of this kind of knowledge requires frequent personal 
interactions between actors (researchers, engineers, managers, etc.) and is difficult 
to realize over great distances (Malmberg and Maskell, 1997).  
In two articles Dahl and Pedersen (2004; 2005) present their results of an 
investigation of social informal networks in a ‘cluster’ of the wireless communication 
industry in Denmark. Overall 346 engineers from 19 firms are surveyed. Nearly three 
Fourth of all respondents indicate informal contacts within the cluster,10 but only 2.6% 
acquired high-value knowledge useful for their own work (Dahl and Pedersen, 2005). 
Particularly, shared prior participation in formal cooperation, work experience (in the 
cluster and the industry) and the existence of private relationships (especially with 
former colleagues) are found to be key elements in determining (high-valuable) 
knowledge acquisition (Dahl and Pedersen, 2004; 2005). These results therefore 
underscore the importance of reputation and trust for informal networking. 
Remarkably, not even the existence of formal competition clauses in respondents’ 
contracts significantly decreases the likelihood of receiving high-value knowledge in 
their networks; though it diminishes informal networking in general. 
Morrison and Rabellotti (2005) raise some doubts concerning frequent reciprocal 
exchange of information and knowledge in cluster structures. For a relatively small 
cluster of wine producing firms in Italy (N=26) they find that ties based on mutual 
transfer are not the dominant form of informal contacts, and therefore question the 
common assumption of ‘dense social interactions based on reciprocity’ in clusters. 
They further show that it is crucial to unravel what is exchanged actually, that is 
information must be distinguished from knowledge.  
                                                 
10
  In their study, an informal contact is defined as: ‘(…) as a person working in another firm (in the 
same local industry) with whom the engineer has a social relationship, which is not part of a formal 
agreement between the two firms.’ (Dahl and Pedersen, 2005:84). 
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Table 1 An example of graphical representation of the differences between 
information networks and knowledge networks 
The information network 
 
The knowledge network 
 
Source: Morrison and Rabellotti (2005:10). 
Whereas the information network has a considerable higher density than the network 
diffusing knowledge (i.e. more actors are connected to each other), it is less 
characterized by reciprocal contacts as well as strong ties at the same time. Almost 
all firms participate in the informal exchange of information. In contrast, access to 
circulating knowledge is restricted to ‘hard core’ of cluster firms. Interestingly, Giuliani 
(2007) shows for another wine cluster that the knowledge network again is more 
dense that the network of business interactions.  
 
4.3 Informal networking between ‘Academia’ and industry 
Studying the specifics of informal knowledge transfer between public academic 
institutions and industry firms (on the level of the individual) has long been a fairly 
neglected research stream in the context of informal networking. The majority of 
research efforts are directed towards more formal arrangements of university-industry 
technology transfer, such as patenting, TTOs, research-based spinoffs, licensing 
agreements, university-based incubator facilities or science parks and incubators 
(e.g. Bozeman, 2000; Clarysse et al., 2005; Link and Scott, 2003; Markman et al., 
2005; Mustar et al., 2006; Phan et al., 2005; Thursby et al., 2009; Schwartz and 
Hornych, 2010). Only a handful of (mostly very recent) studies have touched upon 
the informal side of academic-industry interactions (Link et al., 2007; Grimpe and 
Hussinger, 2008; Grimpe and Fier, 2009). 
Link et al., (2007) for the US as well as Grimpe and Fier (2009) for Germany, in an 
effort to replicate (and extend) the former study, define three channels of informal 
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technology transfer11 between scientists and industry personnel: the 
commercialization of technology, joint publications and (formally) consulting to 
industrial firms. While the share of scientists using consulting is nearly equivalent 
(18% and 17%), commercializing technology is considerably more prevalent in 
Germany (44% compared to 16%). Joint publication was found for 23% in Germany 
and 15% in the US-study. Inter alia, both studies confirm a higher probability for male 
scientists to engage in informal networking and a positive relationship between 
scientists’ age and engagement in informal technology transfer. Grimpe and Fier 
(2009) therefore conclude that institutional differences between the US and Germany 
do not play an important role. Extending the Link et al. (2007) framework by including 
discipline effects reveals, for instance, positive effects to cooperate informally for 
natural sciences and engineering sciences compared to social sciences. In general, 
Grimpe and Fier (2009) survey 800 scientists from universities and government-
funded public research institutes and Link et al. (2007) have a sample population of 
1 514 university scientists and engineers. Unfortunately, both exclude ‘universities of 
applied sciences’ from their analysis. But since these institutions have a strong focus 
on applied research (many professors have also worked in industry firms before), it 
would have been very interesting to investigate and compare their patterns of 
informal networking behavior.  
The general assumption of Grimpe and Hussinger (2008) is that formal and informal 
transfer mechanisms are, mutually beneficial, accompanied by each other, 
interacting rather than being independent channels. They suggest several 
advantages from the firms’ viewpoint to engage in informal networking with academia 
(p.6/7): ‘to browse for relevant technological knowledge without mobilizing substantial 
human or financial resources’, ‘access tacit knowledge surrounding formalized 
knowledge’ and ‘facilitate the attraction of talented researchers’. Using a sample of 
2 000 firms from German manufacturing industries and data from the German part of 
the Community Innovation Survey they find informal technology transfer activities for 
37.6% of the firms; but they do not further specify the term ‘informal technology 
transfer’. Similar to Janowicz-Panjaitan and Noorderhaven (2008) for strategic 
alliances12, Grimpe and Hussinger (2008) detect that both channels not only are 
coexistent in most cases, rather they are complementary, i. e. engagement in 
informal technology transfer arrangements increases benefits of formalized 
connections.  
                                                 
11
  ‘An informal technology transfer mechanism is one facilitating the flow of technological knowledge 
through informal communication processes, such as technical assistance, consulting, and 
collaborative research.’ (Link et al., 2007:642). 
12
  Janowicz-Panjaitan and Noorderhaven (2008) find a positive effect of informal learning behaviors 
on inter-organizational learning in the context of strategic alliances. Drawing on social learning 
theory, the authors base their analysis on a sample of 149 Polish joint ventures with foreign, i.e. 
geographically distant partners. They find that formal and informal learning behaviors between 
alliance partners mutually reinforce each other. 
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5. An agenda of future research directions 
The present paper contributes to the literature by reviewing the fragmented academic 
discussion of the notion of informal networking, thereby discussing theory on how 
these relationships emerge and what conditions are required to make them fruitful 
channel of the knowledge transfer. Furthermore, empirical studies that focus on 
informal networking are reviewed. Based on the findings of this paper, below we 
outline an agenda of future research directions. Five important research gaps can be 
identified. 
First, it becomes clear that studying informal knowledge transfer between public 
academic institutions and industry firms is just in its infancy. However, much more 
interesting seems to be the stunning detail that none of the existing studies in this 
particular field refers explicitly to the concept of informal networking or information 
trading, as it is discussed theoretically above. Those conceptual linkages – contrary 
to what should be assumed – are completely absent. Another missing ingredient in 
these studies is the explicit consideration of the industry in the process of academic-
industry knowledge transfer. Whereas the focus clearly is on (the factors shaping) 
academics’ intention or choice to engage in informal networking with industry 
employees, the other (industry) side of the story is largely ignored. The study of 
informal knowledge transfer between industry actors and academic personnel in 
most cases barely scratches the surface of the rich and complex interactions at work.  
Second, there is only vague knowledge regarding the dynamics, particularly the 
decomposition, of existing informal networks. While some research has been carried 
out to identify the mechanisms that lead to the formation and the sustainment of 
informal networks, two related issues remain unclear. What are the deciding factors 
that lead to decomposition (frequency of activating personal contacts, length of 
relationship, etc.) and by which pace does decomposition takes place? Considering 
the latter question, one may assume that there is certain process of fading-out 
instead of an abrupt abandonment of the relationship. It is also unknown whether 
there are changing patterns of informal knowledge transfer with increasing duration 
of exchange relationships. When and under which circumstances do formal 
relationships develop from prior informal relationships? Does the (economic) value of 
transferred knowledge increases with time? Or, as already asked by Bönte and 
Keilbach (2005): ‘Which factors reduce or increase the incentives to defect from 
informal cooperation?’. The basic problem of most empirical studies trying to 
investigate these processes is that cross-sectional survey data can only capture 
those relationships, which are actively ‘used’ at the time the respective studies are 
conducted. It is difficult to capture prior informal relationships or informal relationships 
that are just in their start-up phase. This problem calls for longitudinal research 
designs.  
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Third, existing research investigated the question whether it is valuable knowledge 
what is exchanged through informal relationships or pieces of information. The 
empirical results so far are ambiguous. In this context, Morrison and Rabellotti (2005) 
showed that the exchange of knowledge with proprietary value is restricted to fewer 
closely connected partners, but information circulates relatively freely within the 
informal network. This finding underscores the importance to differentiate between 
information and knowledge when analyzing the determinants of the structure (e.g., 
density, connectivity of actors, strength of ties, centralization) of informal networks. 
Moreover, such research should account for specific fields of knowledge/ information 
that is exchanged, for instance technical knowledge or business-related knowledge, 
and should consider the kind of relationships between the partners, such as 
‘friendship’ ties and ‘friendly’ ties (Kratzer et al., 2006). Most authors treat the actual 
process of informal knowledge transfer as a black box, that is, they do not investigate 
the type of knowledge being shared. 
Fourth, future research efforts might also focus much stronger on the measurement 
of the impact of informal networking on the performance of individuals and firms. 
Whereas some attempts have been made in the empirical literature (Sattler et al., 
2003)13, the direct measurement of the positive as well as negative14 effects is widely 
neglected. Developing a set of quantitative indicators, if possible, can be an 
important step towards of the identification of ‘the real effects’ informal cooperation. 
For instance, one might compare the performance of individuals or firms that actively 
pursue strategies of information trading with individuals or firms where information 
and knowledge are kept private. With respect to the latter, it might also be interesting 
to investigate the type as well as the effectiveness of firm-specific (formal) 
mechanisms to encourage or block (unintended) innovation-related knowledge 
sharing (e.g., strategic guidelines by management; regulatory frameworks). 
Fifth, another missing part that we recognize as valuable avenue for future research 
relates to the linkages between informal networks and more formalized connections 
that originate from these informal relationships and vice versa. This aspect has been 
partly addressed in the introduction. Informal networks are only one of several 
channels of knowledge transfer between firms or between firms and academic 
                                                 
13
  Sattler et al. (2003:293) use the following variables to capture the potential effects of information 
trading between firms: Information helps to improve product quality, Information helps to improve 
operations, Information helps to reduce costs, Information helps to simplify employee’s job, and 
Information helps to meet safety regulations. 
14
  Partial empirical evidence for the downside of informal networking is provided by Kratzer et al. 
(2008) in an examination of communication patterns between separate units in multi-institutional 
product development collaborations. It is found that highly frequent informal communication is 
positively associated with effectiveness (by facilitating creativity because of rich information flows) 
but also negatively with efficiency of units involved in these collaborations (measured as timely 
completion of assigned tasks), because of a slowdown of work progress or decision-making due to 
close social ties. 
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institutions. Scientists from different disciplines have described numerous forms of 
formal collaboration between organizations. Especially the Management Science 
literature has shown great interest in formal cooperation agreements in the field of 
innovation and R&D (Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 1994; Powell et al., 1996). The 
objectives of research cooperation are either daring to make a joint effort in an 
innovation project or to enable the transfer of technology between the partners. 
Freeman (1991) refers to various forms of cooperation in the field of R&D, for 
example contract research, technological advice or licensing. However, knowledge is 
not only transferred through R&D cooperation, but also in the course of other formal 
agreements. For example, knowledge is often transferred in the context of long-term 
supplier-customer relationships. Unlike pure market transactions (arms-length ties) 
long-term supplier-customer relationships are often accompanied with the building of 
trust (see Jarillo, 1988; Williamson, 1990) which enables the exchange of knowledge 
and joint learning processes (Lundvall, 1988). But as McDonald (1992:53) states 
‘Collaborative agreements do not generate information flow where there was 
previously none at all.’. Prior research has not investigated this relationship so far. 
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